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TAKING THE PIT BULL OFF THE LEASH: 
SICCING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
Ari N. Sommer* 
Abstract: Environmentalists have been warning of catastrophic climate 
change for years, often getting only minimal attention from lawmakers 
and, until recently, the public. With the political climate still moving only 
incrementally, citizen groups and states may have a tactic in the Endan-
gered Species Act to jumpstart the reduction of CO2 emissions. This Note 
examines the implications of a citizen suit to reduce emissions based on 
the section 9 “take” provisions of the Endangered Species Act. It exam-
ines Article III standing requirements alongside the citizen-suit provisions 
of the Endangered Species Act, and the possible existence of a nonjustici-
able political question. The Note takes the position that such a suit could 
move forward successfully, given the right judicial circumstances. 
Introduction 
 The last several years yielded an ongoing, passionate debate be-
tween those who “believe” in anthropogenic climate change, 1  and 
those who remain skeptical of its science, its purported threats, and its 
political uses.2 The debate is lively in the United States Congress, with 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2008–09. 
The author would like to thank the editors and staff of 35 & 36 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev.— 
particularly Dara Newman, Ben Wish, Matthew Murphy, and Christine Yost—for their ef-
forts, assistance, and support. 
1 Throughout this Note, the terms “climate change,” “global climate change,” and 
“global warming” are used interchangeably. Unless otherwise noted, the climate change 
referred to is at least partially anthropogenic. 
2 Compare Wildlife and Oceans in a Changing Climate: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans of the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 110th Cong. 75 (2007) 
[hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement of Rep. Dale E. Kildee, Member, H. Comm. on 
Natural Resources) (recognizing the moral and political responsibility of combating cli-
mate change) and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 
2007: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers, at 1–6, AR4-SYR (2007) [hereinafter IPCC 
Report] (presenting substantial evidence of the threats and causes of climate change) with 
Oversight Hearing, supra, at 116–18 (testimony of Dr. Gary Sharp, Scientific Director, Center 
for Climate/Ocean Resources Study) (focusing dissent on the idea that human contribu-
tion to greenhouse gases is only a small percentage of total greenhouse gas concentra-
tions) and Maura Reynolds & James Gerstenzang, Updating His Spin on Climate Change, L.A. 
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members taking swipes at dissenters and heel-draggers in committee 
hearings3 and in the news.4 Scientists trade barbs in testimony,5 some 
seeming at times to be quoting copy from a bottle of Dr. Bronner’s 
Magic Soap.6 Congress—with the signature of President George W. 
Bush—finally passed a previously unimaginable bill,7 the Energy In-
dependence and Security Act of 2007, which purports to “improve 
our environment” by “reduc[ing] projected CO2 emissions by billions 
of metric tons.”8 The bill increases fuel economy to thirty-five miles 
per gallon by the year 2020, an “increase [in] fuel economy standards 
by 40 percent . . . .”9 
 With the May, 2008 listing of the Polar Bear as a threatened spe-
cies, the Bush Administration seized the opportunity to try to limit 
the oversight of the courts in climate change matters.10 In a statement 
                                                                                                                      
Times, Feb. 11, 2007, at A30 (citing the Bush Administration’s attempt to polish its climate 
change bona fides). 
3 Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 75 (statement of Rep. Kildee) (“To my mind, those 
who question global warming are living in an unreal world. It is there, and we actually 
sponsor it.”). 
4  See Samantha Young, EPA Deletes Large Portions of Documents Turned Over in Calif. 
Greenhouse Gas Case, Associated Press, Jan. 19, 2008, available at http://www.opennntp. 
com/Politics/epa-deletes-large-portions-of-documents-turned-over-in-calif-greenhouse-gas- 
case-737630560.html (noting Senator Barbara Boxer’s threats to subpoena EPA materials 
regarding a rejection of a California tailpipe emissions regulation, should they not be vol-
untarily turned over in their entirety). 
5 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 77 (statement of Dr. Terry L. Root, Senior Fel-
low, Stanford University) (“There has been a lot of disinformation that has been going out 
to all of America, and the scientists, we have been sitting here saying this is not right. Here 
are the facts. This is not right. Here are the facts.”). 
6 Compare Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 125 (statement of Dr. Gary Sharp) (“THE 
AVERAGE FISH DIES WITHIN ITS FIRST WEEK OF LIFE! And—Where does this leave 
our mathematician? With a lot of surviving, not-so-average fish.”) (demonstrating near-
hysterical pitch of some scientists’ criticism) with Charles Leroux, Soap Opera, Chi. Trib., 
Dec. 7, 1999, § 5 (Tempo), at 1, available at http://www.drbronner.com/pdf/chicago_ 
tribune.pdf (“WE’RE ONE! ALL-ONE! EXCEPTIONS ETERNALLY? NONE!”) (quoting 
the soap label). 
7 See Richard Simon, Congress Thought the Unthinkable on Vehicle Mileage, L.A. Times, Dec. 
2, 2007, at A17. 
8 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Bush Signs H.R. 6, the Energy In-
dependence and Sec. Act of 2007 (Dec. 19, 2007) [hereinafter H.R. 6 Press Release] (tran-
script of statement by President Bush at the Department of Energy). See generally Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified in 
scattered sections of 2, 15, 40, 42, and 46 U.S.C.) (giving a purpose of the law as “pro-
mot[ing] research on and deploy[ment of] greenhouse gas capture and storage op-
tions.”). 
9 H.R. 6 Press Release, supra note 8. 
10 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened 
Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212, 
28,212–303 (May 15, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Press Release, U.S. Dept. of 
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accompanying the Polar Bear announcement, Secretary of the Inte-
rior Dirk Kempthorne claimed that the listing “should not open the 
door to use of the [Endangered Species Act] to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions from automobiles, power plants, and other sources.”11 
The Secretary argued that such regulation and policy decisions 
should instead come from open debate and lawmaking in Congress, 
as President Bush stated in April 2008.12 
 As the political process finally forces politicians and policymakers 
to act on the issue of climate change,13 however, the courts have al-
ready handled suits related to climate change for a number of years— 
particularly in reference to endangered and threatened animals. 14 
Various courts have acknowledged anthropogenic climate change as a 
problem in a series of suits throughout the country.15 Amid concerns 
                                                                                                                      
the Interior, Sec’y Kempthorne Announces Decision to Protect Polar Bears Under Endan-
gered Species Act (May 14, 2008) [hereinafter Polar Bear Press Release], available at 
http://www.fws.gov/home/feature/2008/polarbear012308/pdf/DOI_polar_bears_news_ 
release.pdf. 
11 Polar Bear Press Release, supra note 10. 
12 See id. 
13 See Anne E. Kornblut & Alec MacGillis, Warning of Threats, Clinton Sells Clinton: Ex-
President Emphasizes Wife’s Experience, Wash. Post, Dec. 30, 2007, at A1 (reporting that 
President Clinton lists climate change as one of the “challenges” that Senator Clinton 
would be best able to handle out of the Democratic field); Andrew C. Revkin, Agency Af-
firms Human Influence on Climate, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 2007, at A16 (noting the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s acknowledgment of a long-term warming 
trend spurred in part by human activity); see also Peter Gelling & Andrew C. Revkin, Climate 
Talks Take on Added Urgency After Report, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 2007, at A3 (“President Bush 
recently proposed that the world’s biggest countries work toward a common, long-term 
goal set decades in the future, without specific targets or limits, and more immediate goals 
set by individual nations using whatever means they choose.”); Editorial: In Office, The One 
Environmental Issue, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 2008, at A16 (“There is . . . a growing appetite for 
decisive action—everywhere, it seems, except the White House.”). 
14 See Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 460 F.3d 1125, 1161 n.10 
(9th Cir. 2006) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (threatened salmon); Natural Res. Def. Council 
(NRDC) v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 367–70 (E.D. Cal. 2007) [NRDC v. Kemp-
thorne I] (threatened smelt). 
15 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007) (“The harms associated with climate 
change are serious and well recognized.”); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge 
Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 314, 320 (D. Vt. 2007); see NRDC v. Kempthorne I, 506 
F. Supp. 2d at 367–69 (“At the very least, [submitted] studies suggest that climate change 
will be an important aspect of [California water works planning], meriting analysis . . . .”) 
(internal quotations omitted); see also Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 460 F.3d at 1161 n.10 (Fletcher, 
J., dissenting) (“Uncertainty as to the accuracy and adequacy of [a salinity model for Co-
lumbia River dredging] is compounded by the impacts of climate change on the Pacific 
Ocean and Columbia River—how will now-certain rising of sea level impact salinity . . . 
?”); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dis-
cussing problems of climate change and acknowledgement of the same by the govern-
ment). 
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that the comparatively liberal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals would 
have to blaze a vulnerable path in environmental activism within the 
courts,16 the Supreme Court, in its landmark Massachusetts v. EPA de-
cision, opened the door for increased use of the scourges of climate 
change as concrete harms to be redressed.17 
 There are, of course, still plenty of obstacles to overcome to re-
verse or at least mitigate the harms of climate change, both from the 
administration,18 and in the courts.19 Scientists believe that humans 
need to take two different kinds of action immediately—mitigation 
and adaptation.20 “Mitigation” refers to actions to “reduce causes of 
climate change . . . [by] support[ing] . . . measures to reduce the 
levels of greenhouse gas emissions.”21 In terms of wildlife protection, 
“adaptation” refers to “steps to assist wildlife in navigating effects of 
climate change . . . .”22 Concerned private citizens, seeing the need 
to spur mitigation measures while also working through adaptive re-
sponses, could take to the courts to try to effect positive change.23 In-
deed, that pit bull of an environmental statute, 24  the Endangered 
Species Act,25 could provide at least one such opportunity to begin 
the necessary mitigation.26 
                                                                                                                      
16See SCOTUSBlog Stats, Circuit Scorecard—OT06, http://www.scotusblog.com/mov- 
able type/archives/ScorecardOT06.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
17 See 549 U.S. at 522–23. 
18 See Young, supra note 4 (“[T]he [EPA] denied California permission to impose what 
would have been the country’s toughest greenhouse gas standards on cars, trucks and 
sports utility vehicles.”). 
19 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (“Because resolution of the issues 
presented here requires identification and balancing of economic, environmental, foreign 
policy, and national security interests, ‘an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
non-judicial discretion’ is required.”) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)). 
20 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 51–52 (statement of Dr. J. Christopher Haney, 
Chief Scientist, Defenders of Wildlife); id. at 163–66 (statement of The Nature Conser-
vancy). 
21 See id. at 52 (statement of Dr. J. Christopher Haney). 
22 See id. 
23 See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000). 
24 See Paul Boudreaux, Understanding “Take” in the Endangered Species Act, 34 Ariz. St. 
L.J. 733, 733 n.2 (2002); George Cameron Coggins, An Ivory Tower Perspective on Endangered 
Species Law, Nat. Resources & Env’t, Summer 1993 at 3, 3 (noting that early outcomes in 
ESA cases led to this “sobriquet”); Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the 
Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 Envtl. L. 397, 399 n.2 (2004) (ten-
tatively attributing the “pit bull” moniker to Donald Barry, former majority counsel to the 
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries). 
25 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544. 
26 See id. § 1538(a)(1)(B)–(C) (prohibited acts, take provisions). See generally Sarah 
Jane Morath, The Endangered Species Act: A New Avenue for Climate Change Litigation?, 29 Pub. 
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 This Note examines one way to harness the Endangered Species 
Act to reduce CO2 emissions. Specifically, it argues that climate 
change—and those causing it—harm threatened shore birds on both 
coasts of the United States. Part I of this Note examines the causes 
and effects of anthropogenic climate change on oceans and coastal 
habitat. Part II discusses provisions of the Endangered Species Act 
that could be harnessed to force such an injunction. It also presents 
the concept of standing and other constitutional issues implicated in 
litigating such a suit. Part III analyzes one possible suit under the En-
dangered Species Act’s take provisions and concludes that an injunc-
tion ought to be attainable. 
I. Anthropogenic Climate Change: Causes and Effects 
 The science of anthropogenic climate change is constantly evolv-
ing.27 New experimental and observational techniques, data, and mod-
els provide more and more certain information about the warming 
planet, as well as the likelihood that such warming results from human 
contribution to atmospheric greenhouse gases.28 Through this study, 
scientists and policy-makers have learned much about the causes and 
effects of climate change, and have begun to understand how to miti-
gate those causes and adapt to those effects.29 
A. Human Causes of Climate Change 
 Human contribution to climate change is acknowledged and ac-
cepted in many well-respected venues, and is widely considered to be 
scientific consensus.30 In accepting the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—shared with 
former vice president Al Gore—chairman Rajendra Pachauri explained 
that “thousands of scientists had spent two decades documenting global 
                                                                                                                      
Land & Resources L. Rev. 23 (2008) (tracing an ESA suit on the basis of the destruction 
of the polar bear’s critical habitat). 
27 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of Dr. Joshua J. Lawler, Assistant 
Professor, College of Forest Resources, University of Washington) (describing ongoing 
research techniques and findings). 
28 See id.; IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
29 See generally Oversight Hearing, supra note 2 (providing substantial testimony and dis-
cussion regarding causes and effects of climate change). 
30 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 509–11 (2007); Mary Jordan, Gore Accepts 
Nobel Prize with Call for Bold Action, Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 2007, at A14; Press Release, The 
Norwegian Nobel Comm., The Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 (Oct. 12, 2007) [hereinafter 
Nobel Press Release] (“[F]or their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge 
about man-made climate change . . . .”). 
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warming.”31 The discussion and negotiation is now moving to amelio-
rating—through mitigation of and adaptation to—the harms caused by 
climate change.32 Pachauri, speaking at the December 2007 meeting of 
government leaders in Bali, demanded, “[w]ill those responsible for 
decisions in the field of climate change at the global level listen to the 
voice of science and knowledge, which is now loud and clear?”33 
 Humans contribute to climate change through the release of 
greenhouse gases at a rate and scale that overwhelms the natural bal-
ance of atmospheric gases.34 Particularly, humans emit CO2 through 
the burning of fossil fuels; methane as a result of agriculture, waste, 
and energy production; and nitrous oxide from agriculture.35 Power 
plants and automobiles are major sources of CO2 emissions.36 Before 
the Industrial Revolution, the natural world was “fairly well balanced” 
in terms of the ambient presence of greenhouse gases, with injections 
of additional atmospheric CO2 coming from volcanic activity and simi-
lar natural processes.37 By contrast,current concentrations of CO2 and 
methane in the atmosphere “exceed by far the natural range over the 
last 650,000 years.”38 Indeed, the current human contribution to at-
mospheric CO2 is believed to be fifty times that of natural processes 
over a given period.39 As Dr. Ken Caldeira noted in his testimony to 
Congress, assuming “we cut [ninety-eight] percent of our emissions, 
we would be doubling . . . natural geologic source[s] of CO2 to our 
atmosphere.”40 
 That said, scientists posit that only approximately three percent 
of all atmospheric CO2 is due to human activity, whether through fos-
                                                                                                                      
31 See Jordan, supra note 30, at A14. 
32 See id. 
33 Id. 
34 See, e.g., Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 
2d 295, 309 (D. Vt. 2007) (“‘EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection 
between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global warming . . . .’”) (quoting Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 523); Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 64 (testimony of Bill 
McKibben, Author and Scholar in Residence, Middlebury College) (discussing imbalance 
caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions). 
35 See Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 308–09; IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 
4–5. 
36 See Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 308–09; IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 
4–5. 
37 Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 64 (testimony of Bill McKibben). Mr. McKibben 
adroitly acknowledged that not even Congress could legislate against volcanoes. See id. 
38 IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 4. 
39 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 90 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira, Department 
of Global Ecology, Carnegie Institute of Washington). 
40 See id. 
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sil-fuel use, or deforestation and other land-use changes.41 Dissenting 
members of Congress have pounced on this fact to suggest that hu-
man contribution is, in fact, minimal.42 Congressman Wayne T. Gil-
chrest, Democrat from Maryland, responded to these skeptics: “If you 
have a scale with 1,000 pounds on each side and it is balanced, you 
add one pound to one side, which is extraordinarily tiny, and it goes 
off balance. To some extent, that is what we are doing.”43 As such, 
burning fossil fuels and otherwise contributing to the greenhouse ef-
fect over-saturates the atmosphere in such a way that natural processes 
cannot counterbalance this anthropogenic influence.44 
B. The Effects of Climate Change on Wildlife 
 Warming resulting from anthropogenic climate change affects 
wildlife and their habitats on an increasingly alarming scale.45 The only 
slight increase in temperature on land is largely thanks to the oceans, 
which absorb approximately eighty percent of the heat added to the 
climate system.46 The oceans, an integral part of the carbon balance, 
act both as a depository for excess carbon from CO2 and as a sink for 
excess heat, but have been overwhelmed by continuous CO2 output.47 
Thus, anthropogenic climate change is harming our oceans and shore-
lines in addition to having effects on ambient temperature on land.48 
 This warming through the increased introduction of CO2 into 
the atmosphere alters the “physical and biogeochemical characteris-
tics” of the oceans.49 Such CO2 imbalance and the resulting warming 
leads to actual heating of the oceans and a rise in sea levels.50 Addi-
tionally, the general warming of the planet by a mere one-and-a-half 
                                                                                                                      
41 See id. at 64 (examination of Bill McKibben by Rep. Henry E. Brown, Jr.); IPCC Re-
port, supra note 2, at 4. 
42 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 63–64 (examination of Bill McKibben by 
Rep. Henry E. Brown, Jr.). 
43 See id. at 66 (statement of Rep. Wayne T. Gilchrest). 
44 See id. at 50 (statement of Dr. J. Christopher Haney); id. at 160–61 (statement of The 
Nature Conservancy). 
45 See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 
340–41 (D. Vt. 2007); Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 160–61 (statement of The Nature 
Conservancy). 
46 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 160–61 (statement of The Nature Conser-
vancy); IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 1. 
47 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 161–62. 
48 See id. 
49 Id. at 161. 
50 See id. at 89–91 (testimony of Dr. Ken Caldeira); id. at 161 (statement of The Nature 
Conservancy). Warming will also lead to increased ocean acidification. Id. at 90–91. 
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to two degrees Celsius over end-of-century levels could cause up to 
thirty percent of species studied by the IPCC—and up to eighty per-
cent in regional biota—to be at a higher risk of extinction.51 
1. Heating the Oceans, Heating the Planet, and Effects on Wildlife 
 Actual ocean heating is problematic because it decreases solubility 
of oxygen into water and harms the ability of deep, cool, nutrient-rich 
water to mix with and feed the upper, warmer ocean strata.52 Oxygen 
dissolves more easily in cold water; many fisheries are dependent on 
highly active cold-water fish such as tuna.53 As the waters warm, oxygen-
loving fish will follow the cooler waters poleward, leaving behind tradi-
tional feeding grounds and the fishermen who frequent them.54 While 
many individual species will be so affected, scientists do not believe that 
entire ecosystems will be able to migrate as one unit.55 Thus, seabirds, 
not realizing that their quarry has moved to cooler waters farther pole-
ward, may continue to hunt in traditional feeding grounds only to find 
them barren or markedly diminished.56 Seabird deaths in California 
and Oregon have already been linked to such changes in the availabil-
ity of food.57 
 In addition to the oxygen provided to fish and other marine crea-
tures by cool, deep water, such water also provides nutrients to much 
smaller photosynthetic organisms in the surface waters. 58 Decreased 
mixing of deep wells with surface waters due to a more-marked tem-
perature difference, and the resulting nutrient deprivation to surface 
strata, could cause widespread harm throughout the oceanic food 
chain, including harm to great whales and other wildlife dependent on 
photosynthetic organisms as a food source.59 
                                                                                                                      
51 See id. at 29, 32–33 (statement of Dr. Terry L. Root); IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 9; 
J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Fu-
ture, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 26 (2008). 
52 Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira). 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. 
57 Id. 
58 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira). 
59 See id. This same “cap” has potentially catastrophic effects on the meridional over-
turning circulation of the Atlantic Ocean—the oceanic “conveyor” that circulates ocean 
waters both from deep to shallow and from West to East—potentially causing widespread 
decrease in ecosystem productivity and ocean CO2 uptake, in addition to changes in global 
weather patterns. See IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 13. 
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2. The Rising Sea 
 As the climate warms from increased anthropogenic introduction 
of CO2 and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, sea levels 
are expected to rise precipitously.60 This is due not only to increased 
freshwater releases from terrestrial ice sheets or increased flows from 
snowpack-fed rivers, 61 but also to the simple molecular expansion 
that occurs in all substances when heated—an effect that has vast con-
sequences when spread across an entire world of water.62 One esti-
mate predicts that, should CO2 and other greenhouse emissions go 
unchanged, there could be as much as a one-foot rise in sea levels 
worldwide by the end of the century solely as a result of thermal ex-
pansion.63 Whatever the additional rise in sea level because of melting 
land ice,64 even a one-foot rise will result in increased beach erosion, 
destruction of coastal dune and intertidal habitats, and heightened 
salinity of estuarine deltas.65 
 Increased beach erosion will harm the habitats of several coastal 
species.66 Dunes and sandy areas above the high tide line will be par-
ticularly vulnerable, as increased severe weather and flooding is ex-
pected to impact these loosely packed areas severely. 67  Reduced 
                                                                                                                      
60 See Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 460 F.3d 1125, 1161 n.10 
(9th Cir. 2006) (Fletcher, J., dissenting); Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 1–2 (statement 
of Del. Madeline Z. Bordallo, Chairwoman); id. at 91–92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira); 
see also IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 13 (“Contraction of the Greenland ice sheet is pro-
jected to continue to contribute to sea level rise . . . .”). 
61 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 91–92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira); IPCC 
Report, supra note 2, at 13. 
62 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 91–92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira). 
63 See id. (referring to such a rise as far more certain than projected amounts of sea-
level rise from melting ice this century). A two-foot level rise would wipe out 10,000 square 
miles of coastal land and habitat. See id. at 92. 
64 Complete elimination of the Greenland ice sheet could result in a sea level rise of 
seven meters; the good news, though, is that for this to happen, warming would need to 
continue for millennia at warming between approximately two and 4.5 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial temperatures. See IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 13. 
65 See Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 460 F.3d at 1161 n.10 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); Oversight 
Hearing, supra note 2, at 92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira); id. at 142 (statement of Dr. 
John T. Everett, President and Consultant, Ocean Associates, Inc.); id. at 160 (statement of 
The Nature Conservancy); IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 13. Scientists also expect flooding 
of low-lying coastal wetlands and sea grass prairies. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 49 
(statement of Dr. J. Christopher Haney). 
66 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira); id. at 160 
(statement of The Nature Conservancy); see also Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 
C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (2007) (listing coastal habitats for threatened western snowy and piping 
plovers). 
67 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira). 
282 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:273 
beaches would mean a smaller feeding and nesting ground for shore 
birds like the piping plover, a threatened species on the Atlantic coast, 
and the western snowy plover, a threatened species on the Pacific 
coast.68 Though such erosion is an ongoing process, the natural re-
sponse has been to slowly move the beach and coastal habitats inland.69 
With human development along the coasts, however, habitats have no 
room to recede, and can be easily lost.70 
3. Shore Birds: The Western Snowy Plover and the Piping Plover 
 Two species that are particularly sensitivite to rising oceans are 
the threatened Pacific coast population of western snowy plovers, and 
the threatened Atlantic coast population of piping plovers. 71  Both 
species of plover nest and feed on the coasts: the western snowy plov-
er’s range extends from mid-Washington all the way into Mexico; pip-
ing plovers range from the Canadian Maritime Provinces to North 
Carolina, with wintering habitats in the Gulf of Mexico.72 Both species 
breed and nest on sandy beaches above the high tide line, on flats, or 
on shallow-sloping foredunes. 73  While new broods of both species 
                                                                                                                      
68 See id. at 49 (statement of Dr. J. Christopher Haney); 50 C.F.R § 17.11(h) (listing 
both plovers as threatened and giving respective ranges); Endangered and Threatened 
Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered and Threatened Status for the Piping 
Plover, 50 Fed. Reg. 50,726, 50,726–34 (Dec. 11, 1985) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)); 
New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Div. of Fish & Wildlife, Piping Plover, Cha-
radrius melodus 1–2, available at http://www.state.nj.us/dep/fgw/ensp/pdf/end-
thrtened/plover.pdf; WesternSnowyPlover.org, Western Snowy Plover Natural 
History and Population Trends 1 (2001), available at http://www.westernsnowyplover. 
org/pdfs/plover_ natural_history.pdf; see also discussion infra Part I.B.3. Increased ocean 
waters in river delta areas can also inhibit spawning or feeding of threatened estuarine 
fish, which require specific salinity and temperature levels to propagate new broods. See 
Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 460 F.3d at 1161–62 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (Columbia River 
salmon); NRDC v. Kempthorne, No. 1:05-cv-1207, 2007 WL 1989015, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 
3, 2007) [NRDC v. Kempthorne II] (California Delta smelt); NRDC v. Kempthorne I, 506 F. 
Supp. 2d 322, 335, 369–70 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (California delta smelt). 
69 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira). 
70 See id. 
71 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira); id. at 161–
62 (statement of The Nature Conservancy); 50 C.F.R § 17.11(h) (listing the species as 
threatened); Anne Hecht et al., United States Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) 
Region Five, Piping Plover (Charadrius melodus) Atlantic Coast Population Re-
vised Recovery Plan 6–7 (1996), available at http://ecos.fws.gov/docs/recovery_plan/ 
960502.pdf; Kelly Hornaday et al., USFWS, California/Nevada Operations Office, 
Recovery Plan for the Pacific Coast Population of the Western Snowy Plover 
(Charadrius alexandrinus nivosus) 7–8 (2007), available at http://ecos.fws.gov/docs/ 
recovery_plan/070924.pdf. 
72 See Hecht, et al., supra note 71, at 2; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, at 2. 
73 Hecht et al., supra note 71, at 6; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, at 11–12. 
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generally do not stay in the nest area after hatching, they will typically 
range along the shore in habitats similar to their natal areas.74 Drift-
wood, seaweed, and light vegetation—in combination with natural 
cryptic coloration—are used by chicks and adults of both species for 
cover from predators, as well as for other sheltering purposes.75 Plov-
ers of both species feed on insect larvae, mollusks, and other inverte-
brates in the moist intertidal sands, in kelp and other organic detritus 
at the wrack-line, and in washover areas where storm surges have 
washed between dunes.76 As such, much of the threatened plovers’ 
breeding, feeding, and sheltering habitat and habits are vulnerable to 
the expected sea-level rise and increase in severe weather from cli-
mate change.77 
 As waters rise, oceans and skies warm, and coastal habitat goes 
the way of the dodo, conservationists, policymakers, and concerned 
citizens will need legal avenues to enjoin activities that harm species 
native to these habitats.78 The Endangered Species Act comes ready-
equipped with some of the tools necessary to achieve such protec-
tion.79 
II. Citizen Mitigation Measures: The Endangered Species Act’s 
Prohibition Against Take, and Citizen-Suit Provisions 
 The early 1970s saw a marked increase in the amount of environ-
mental legal activism in the United States.80 In his first State of the Un-
ion Address following his reelection, President Richard M. Nixon called 
                                                                                                                      
74 See Hecht et al., supra note 71, at 8–9; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, at 14–15. 
75 Hecht et al., supra note 71, at 11; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, at 12. 
76 Hecht et al., supra note 71, at 11; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, at 17–18. A 
wrack-line is the line of seaweed and debris deposited on a beach by tidal movement. 
Hecht et al., supra note 71, at 11 n.1. 
77 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira), 161–62 
(statement of The Nature Conservancy); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.11(h) (2007); Hecht et al., supra note 71, at 6–11; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, 
at 11–18; IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 1, 11–12. 
78 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 37 (statement of Monica Medina, Acting 
Director, International Fund for Animal Welfare) (“[T]he government must use the . . . 
[ESA] to begin to take actions that will conserve these animals and their habitat.”). 
79 Id.; see Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000). 
80 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000); 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2000). The Clean Air Act (CAA) was passed in its 
modern form in 1970, and was extensively amended in 1977 and 1999. Plater et al., 
Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and Society, at Reference 50 (3d. ed. 
2004). The Clean Water Act (CWA) was passed in its modern form in 1972, with significant 
amendments in 1977 and 1987. Id. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) was passed in 1973 
with significant amendments in 1978 and 1982. Id. 
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for strengthening regulations for the protection of endangered spe-
cies.81 Support in Congress for what became the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) was overwhelming, 82 as judged by the dearth of dissent and 
discussion regarding the original bills.83 The only substantive debate in 
each house addressed the potential division of responsibilities between 
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the Fish and Wild-
life Service (USFWS).84 As he signed the final bill, President Nixon 
stated, “[t]his legislation provides the Federal Government with needed 
authority to protect an irreplaceable part of our national heritage— 
threatened wildlife.”85 
 The ESA has been described as one of the most effective environ-
mental statutes ever passed by Congress, largely because of its absolutist 
stance.86 Its most powerful provisions strictly forbid certain actions,87 
while others absolutely require action,88 regardless of cost or conven-
ience.89 For instance, whether or not Congress realized exactly how 
strong a statute it was creating, the authorizing conference committee 
added the low-threshold term “harm” to the statutory definition of 
“take,” the prohibited act of killing or otherwise harassing an endan-
gered species.90 While Congress certainly intended to protect widely-
recognized charismatic megafauna,91 they probably were not thinking 
about diminutive, widely—but thinly—dispersed, uncharismatic crea-
tures.92 
                                                                                                                      
81 Stan. Envtl. Law Soc’y, The Endangered Species Act 20 (2001). 
82 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544. 
83 Stan. Envtl. Law Soc’y, supra note 81, at 21. 
84 See id. NMFS is under the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration, and is responsible for maritime species under the ESA; USFWS, 
under the Department of the Interior, is responsible for “terrestrial and avian species,” as well 
as freshwater species. Id.; see also USFWS, ESA Basics: 30 Years of Protecting Endangered 
Species 1 (2006) [hereinafter ESA Basics], available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/ 
lps56603/ESA+BASICS_050806.pdf. 
85 See Statement on Signing the Endangered Species Act, 5 Pub. Papers 374 (Dec. 28, 
1973). President Nixon continued, “[N]othing is more priceless and more worthy of pres-
ervation than the rich array of animal life with which our country has been blessed.” Id. 
86 See Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental 
Law, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 1411–12 (2005). 
87 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (prohibition of take). 
88 See Id. § 1536(a) (agency cooperation and no-jeopardy provisions). 
89 See Sinden, supra note 86, at 1411. 
90 See Stan. Envtl. Law Soc’y, supra note 81, at 21; Coggins, supra note 24, at 3; see 
also § 1532(19) (defining “take”); § 1538(a)(1)(b) (prohibiting “take”). 
91 See Coggins, supra note 24, at 3 (listing several “glamour” species, including wolves, 
grizzly bears, whales, and bald eagles). 
92 See Stan. Envtl. Law Soc’y, supra note 81, at 21–22; Coggins, supra note 24, at 3. 
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 The ESA yields many protections of—and suits based on—small, 
less conventionally charismatic species. 93  As an early case—Tennessee 
Valley Authority v. Hill—noted, the plain language of the ESA requires 
that priority be given to the endangered species, regardless of its stature 
or the pressing equities against its preservation.94 Additionally, in Bab-
bitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon—a Supreme 
Court case pitting significant family-owned and corporate timber inter-
ests against an endangered woodpecker and a threatened owl—the 
Court upheld a broad regulatory definition of “harm,” part of the 
“take” provisions, based on clear congressional intent. 95  The forest-
products companies challenged the regulation facially, likely fearing an 
injunction under the ESA against their activities should they threaten 
the designated endangered or threatened species.96 The Court cited 
both Senate and House reports that explicitly stated that “take” is to be 
defined to have the “broadest possible” meaning and effect, and up-
held the regulation.97 This case introduces several important concepts 
in endangered species law: listing of species, 98  prohibition against 
take,99 and the remedy of injunction.100 
                                                                                                                      
93 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 692 
(1995) (red-cockaded woodpecker, in addition to the northern spotted owl); Tenn. Valley 
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 158–62 (1978) (snail darter, a diminutive perch-like fish); Mar-
bled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 1996) (marbled murrelet, a solitary 
seabird); NRDC v. Kempthorne I, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 328 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (delta smelt); 
Endangered and Threatened Species, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (2007) (listing all currently 
endangered and threatened animals). 
94 Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 184, 194–95 (“The plain intent of Congress in enacting 
[the ESA] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.”) 
(emphasis added); see § 1531(c) (policy); § 1532(3) (definition of “conserve” and related 
variants); § 1536; Stan. Envtl. Law Soc’y, supra note 81, at 22. Though the Hill decision 
focused on the agency-related section 7 of the ESA, and this Note focuses on the protec-
tions in section 9, courts looking at section 9 protections have heeded the Hill Court’s 
admonition regarding priorities. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 698–99 (“Although the [sec-
tion] 9 ‘take’ prohibition was not at issue in Hill, we took note of that prohibition, placing 
particular emphasis on the Secretary’s inclusion of habitat modification in his definition of 
‘harm.’”) (citing Hill, 437 U.S. at 184 n.30); Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 167–68 (1st Cir. 
1997) (including the strong language of Hill in its discussion of preemption, section 9, and 
the Marine Mammals Protection Act). 
95 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 704–05. 
96 See id. at 692–93; Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1068 (remedy of injunction). 
97 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 704 (citing S. Rep. No. 93-307, at 7 (1973) and H.R. Rep. No. 
93–412, at 15 (1973)). 
98 § 1533(a)(1) (section 1533 is generally referred to as section 4, based on the origi-
nal Act’s numbering); see also discussion infra Part II.A. 
99 § 1538(a)(1)(B)–(C) (section 9); see § 1532(19) (defining “take”); Boudreaux, su-
pra note 24, at 739–43 (introducing the concept of “take”). 
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 The ESA provides separate sections for congressional findings, 
statutory definitions, and listing of species.101 Analyzing the possibility 
of an injunction against CO2 emissions through an ESA suit requires an 
examination of sections 4, 9, and 11 of the Act. Section 4 provides for 
the listing of species as either endangered or threatened.102 Section 9 
sets out prohibitions on certain actions with regard to those listed spe-
cies.103 Section 11 provides wide private empowerment through its citi-
zen-suit provisions.104 
A. Section 4: Listing of Endangered and Threatened Species 
 Section 4 of the ESA provides the framework for how a species 
gains its special protected status.105 Under section 4, the designated 
Secretary—Interior or Commerce—may list a species either at the 
initiative of USFWS or NMFS, or in response to a petition by an inter-
ested party.106 The procedure is similar for either route, with the citi-
zen petition receiving a ninety-day review to screen for a lack of “sub-
stantial scientific or commercial information indicating that the 
petitioned action may be warranted.”107 According to the ESA: 
 The Secretary shall . . . determine whether any species is 
an endangered species or a threatened species because of 
any of the following factors: 
 (A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, 
or curtailment of its habitat or range; 
 (B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, 
or educational purposes; 
 (C) disease or predation; 
                                                                                                                      
100 See § 1540(g)(1)(A); Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1068 (citing Forest Conservation 
Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1995)); Boudreaux, supra note 
24, at 750–52 (“[T]he Court of Appeals for the species-rich Ninth Circuit[] has concluded 
that the ESA entitles a plaintiff to an injunction against conduct that is expected to cause a 
take in the imminent future.”). 
101 § 1531 (section 2 findings); § 1532 (section 3 definitions); § 1533 (section 4 list-
ing). 
102 § 1533. 
103 Id. Section 7 also provides protections through requirements for federal agencies. 
§ 1536. Additionally, section 10 builds exceptions, permit programs, and conservation 
plans into the statutory scheme. § 1539. 
104 § 1540(g). 
105 See generally § 1533(a)–(b) (providing for listing of threatened or endangered spe-
cies). 
106 See § 1533(a)(1), (b)(3); Stan. Envtl. Law Soc’y, supra note 81, at 38–39. 
107 § 1533(b)(3)(A); see Stan. Envtl. Law Soc’y, supra note 81, at 38–39. 
2009] Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act 287 
 (D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or 
 (E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its contin-
ued existence.108 
By declaring the species endangered, the relevant Service has decided 
that the species is “in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant 
portion of its range.”109 A threatened species is one that is “likely to be-
come an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout 
all or a significant portion of its range.”110 
 In deciding whether to list a species, economic considerations are 
not to enter into the determination, as the purpose of listing is solely 
the preservation or recovery of the species.111 Indeed, Congress in-
serted the words “solely on the basis of the best scientific and com-
mercial data available”112 to remove any other factors from considera-
tion of listing.113 Species are not protected by the ESA until they have 
been listed, and any positive finding—a finding that a species should 
be listed as either endangered or threatened—is not reviewable by a 
court.114 
B. Section 9: Prohibition Against Take 
1. Definitions and Hurdles 
 While the ESA provides some protection in section 7 through a 
requirement of consultation and study before most government ac-
tions might impact an endangered or threatened species,115 it is the 
                                                                                                                      
108 § 1533(a)(1). 
109 § 1532(6). 
110 § 1532(20). 
111 See Stan. Envtl. Law Soc’y, supra note 81, at 39–40. Compare § 1533(b)(1)(A) 
(scientific and ecological bases for consideration of listing species) (emphasis added) with 
§ 1533(b)(1)(B)(2) (scientific, economic, and “any other” bases—for example, national secu-
rity—for consideration of designation of critical habitat) (emphasis added). 
112 § 1533(b)(1)(A). This is also reflected in USFWS regulations. See Factors for List-
ing, Delisting, or Reclassifying Species, 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(b) (2007). 
113 See Stan. Envtl. Law Soc’y, supra note 81, at 39–40. 
114 Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 904 (D.D.C. 1997); Stan. Envtl. 
Law Soc’y, supra note 81, at 49; see § 1533(b)(3)(C)(ii) (“Any negative finding . . . shall 
be subject to judicial review.”). At the same time that USFWS determines a species is en-
dangered or threatened, Congress requires a designation of a critical habitat for the spe-
cies, to the “maximum extent prudent and determinable.” § 1533(a)(3). 
115 See generally § 1536 (interagency cooperation); Stan. Envtl. Law Soc’y, supra note 
81, at 78–103 (discussing section 7 requirements for federal agencies); Christopher H. M. 
Carter, Comment, A Dual Track for Incidental Takings: Reexamining Sections 7 and 10 of the 
Endangered Species Act, 19 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 135, 136 (1991). 
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Act’s section 9 that provides most of the bite for private citizens.116 
Section 9 prohibits any person to “take” endangered or threatened 
species, either within the United States or its territorial seas, or “upon 
the high seas.”117 “Person” is broadly defined as any “individual, cor-
poration . . . or any other private entity; or any officer [or] employee 
. . . of the Federal Government, of any State . . . or political subdivi-
sion . . . or . . . foreign government . . . subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States.”118 
 “Take” is a somewhat unfortunate term, both because of occa-
sional confusion with the concept of a Fifth Amendment “taking,” 
when both concepts are implicated in the same paper or pleading,119 
and because of how much is meant to be encompassed in just one 
short word.120 As defined by the ESA, the provision forbids persons to 
“harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or col-
lect, or to attempt” to do any such violence to an endangered spe-
cies.121 Regulations extend such protection to threatened species as 
well.122 
 The prohibition against take further protects endangered and 
threatened species through regulatory definition of the word 
“harm.”123 While most of the other prohibited acts under “take” are 
more direct, “A does X to B” acts, like hunting or harassing, “harm” 
allows for a more attenuated causal connection between a person’s 
action and the effect on the species.124 The Supreme Court, in its 
                                                                                                                      
116 See § 1538(a) (prohibited acts); Boudreaux, supra note 24, at 733. 
117 § 1538(a)(1)(B)–(C). 
118 § 1532(13). 
119 See U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”); Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and “Takings”: A 
Call for Innovation Within the Terms of the Act, 24 Envtl. L. 355, 360–62 (1994); Cori S. Par-
obek, Of Farmers’ Takes and Fishes’ Takings: Fifth Amendment Compensation Claims When the 
Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights Collide, 27 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 177, 193–94, 
211–12 (2003). 
120 § 1532(19); see Boudreaux, supra note 24, at 735–36; Federico Cheever, An Introduc-
tion to the Prohibition Against Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning 
to Live with a Powerful Species Preservation Law, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 109, 109–11 (1991). 
121 §§ 1532(19), 1538(a)(1)(B)–(C) (emphasis added); Endangered Wildlife: Prohibi-
tions, 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(c) (2007); see ESA Basics, supra note 84, at 1; Stan. Envtl. L. 
Soc’y, supra note 81, at 106. 
122 Threatened Wildlife: Prohibitions, 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (2007) (“[A]ll of the provi-
sions in § 17.21 shall apply to threatened wildlife . . . .”). 
123 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2007) (defi-
nitions); Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 106–07; Cheever, supra note 120, at 110. 
124 50 C.F.R. § 17.3; see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 
U.S. 687, 704–05 (1995) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 15 (1973) (noting Congress’s 
intent that “take,” and its constituent parts, be construed in the “broadest possible 
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Sweet Home decision, upheld the Department of the Interior’s regula-
tion defining “harm” to include acts that “actually kill[] or injure[] 
wildlife . . . . Such act[s] may include significant habitat modifica-
tion or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by signifi-
cantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, 
feeding or sheltering.”125 Indeed, the Court’s examination of Senate 
and House reports affirmed its interpretation that “take” ought to be 
defined to have the “broadest possible” meaning and effect.126 Addi-
tionally, though the regulation seems to require evidence of death or 
injury, the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii found in Palila 
v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources (Palila II ), that 
regulations do not first require a “finding of death to individual species 
members” before finding or acting on a take.127 
 If harm has not already occurred, a take can still be proven by 
demonstration of “a reasonable certainty of imminent harm.”128 Fol-
lowing the Sweet Home decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reaffirmed its Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co. 
holding, stating that “a reasonably certain threat of future harm is suf-
ficient to support a permanent injunction under the ESA.”129 How-
ever, the Palila II court declined to require imminence, noting that all 
that is required is “[h]abitat destruction that prevents the recovery of 
the species by affecting essential behavioral patterns,” which, in turn, 
                                                                                                                      
terms”)); Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land and Natural Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1077–83 (D. 
Haw. 1986) [Palila II], aff’d, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) [Palila II Aff.]; Palila v. Haw. 
Dep’t of Land and Natural Res., 471 F. Supp. 985, 995 (D. Haw. 1979) [Palila I], aff’d, 639 
F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) [Palila I Aff.]. 
125 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 691 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994)). The language from 
1994 is identical to that published in 2007. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the harm need not be to officially designated critical habitat, but to any habitat 
used by the species. See Cheever, supra note 120, at 157–58 (citing Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 
F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 
926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
126 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 703–05 (citing S. Rep. No. 93-307, at 7 (1973) and H.R. 
Rep. No. 93–412, at 15 (1973)). 
127 Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1077; Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 107–08. 
128 Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 111–12 (citing Marbled Murrelet v. Babbit, 
83 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lum-
ber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1995). 
129 Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 1996); see Sweet Home, 515 
U.S. at 702–03. The Sweet Home Court compared section 9’s prohibitions against habitat 
modification with section 5’s enabling of the Secretary to purchase land to protect species. 
In its comparison, the Court seemingly overlooked 9th Circuit jurisprudence and claims 
that injunction cannot issue until actual harm occurs. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 702–03; 
see also Boudreaux, supra note 24, at 750–51. 
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causes actual injury to the listed species.130 The court emphasized that 
a showing of harm “does not require a decline in population num-
bers.”131 The court contended that, otherwise, such a wait-and-see atti-
tude towards species extinction would be “shortsighted.”132 
2. Causation 
 The definition and interpretation of harm bring into question the 
traditional tort concept of causation, both cause-in-fact and proximate 
cause.133 ESA harm cases should generally be no different from a nor-
mal torts case in that—in addition to a harm and an action—one must 
show cause-in-fact as well as proximate cause linking the action to the 
harm.134 Cause-in-fact looks to see if a harm would be avoided, but for 
the actions of a defendant.135 Proximate cause, as in tort, is judged by 
the foreseeability harm arising from a given action.136 So long as the 
actions are not severed from the causal chain by the subsequent, inter-
vening acts of a third party, a defendant can be held to have proxi-
mately caused the harm, leading to liability under the ESA.137 
C. Section 11 and Litigation Issues: Parties, Standing,  
Justiciability, and Injunction 
 Under section 11 of the ESA, “any person may commence a civil 
suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person . . . who is alleged to be 
in violation of . . . [the Act] or regulation issued under the authority 
thereof.”138 ESA suits commence in the federal district courts within 
                                                                                                                      
130 649 F. Supp. at 1075. 
131 Id. at 1077. 
132 See id. at 1075; Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 112. 
133 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697–98 (rejecting reading “directly” caused into the 
definition of harm); id. at 699 (characterizing as “strong” respondent Sweet Home’s argu-
ments that “unforeseeable” harm would not violate the harm provision); id. at 708–09 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (limiting application of the harm provision to cases where 
proximate cause can be shown); see also Cheever, supra note 120, at 179–184. 
134 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700 n.13; Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 109; 
Boudreaux, supra note 24, at 748–50; Ruhl, supra note 51, at 40. 
135 See James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate Cause: Lessons from Tort Law 
About Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water Users and Other Joint Habitat Modi-
fiers, 33 Envtl. L. 595, 599 (2003). 
136 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700 n.13. 
137 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168–69 (1997); Rasband, supra note 135, at 598. 
138 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1), (g)(1)(A) (2000). See Coggins, 
supra note 24, at 3 (“[T]he ESA so far has turned out to be a triumph for the rule of law as 
enforced through citizen suits by private attorneys general.”) In addition to this provision, 
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the judicial district of the alleged violation.139 A plaintiff must first 
give sixty days notice to the alleged violator and the appropriate Sec-
retary before commencing suit.140 Despite these generous provisions, 
an action brought to an Article III court must also satisfy basic consti-
tutional requirements, including standing and justiciability.141 As the 
case law shows, getting into court can be harder than it sounds.142 
1. Parties 
 Because of standing requirements discussed infra, choice of 
plaintiffs and defendants for ESA litigation must be delicately consid-
ered. 143  Environmental groups like the Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC) are reasonably successful at bringing suits alleging 
injury to members, both because of their extensive experience in 
such litigation and relatively high financial assets.144 Private citizens, 
naturalists, and scientists can also make good plaintiffs, in that they 
can easily demonstrate their aesthetic and scientific injuries.145 States 
have also gained wide standing rights in environmental suits.146 Be-
cause choice of plaintiffs is intricately bound up with the concept of 
injury as part of standing requirements, a separate section infra is de-
voted to this concept.147 
                                                                                                                      
there are also two additional avenues for citizen enforcement, both of which would compel 
the relevant secretary to act, either under section 9 or section 4. See § 1540(g)(1)(B)–(C). 
139 § 1540(g)(3)(A). 
140 § 1540(g)(2)(A). 
141 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (ability to hear cases or controversies); § 1540(g) (pen-
alties and enforcement, citizen suits); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007); 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Defenders of Wildlife v. Ho-
del, 851 F.2d 1035, 1038–39 (8th Cir. 1988). 
142 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1038–39; Hawaiian Crow 
(‘Alala) v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549, 551–52 (D. Haw. 1991) (rejecting an animal’s standing 
under the ESA). 
143 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–64; Hawaiian Crow, 906 F. Supp. at 551–52; see also 
Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 203 (considering animal standing). 
144 See generally NRDC v. Kempthorne I, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. Cal. 2007)(NRDC as 
plaintiff); NRDC: Our Conservation Victories, http://www.nrdc.org/about/victories.asp 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2009) (listing victories in petitions and litigation on behalf of endan-
gered and threatened wildlife). 
145 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–64; see also discussion infra, Part II.C.2.a–c. 
146 See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (granting states wider standing in en-
vironmental suits). 
147 See id.; discussion infra Part II.C.2.a. 
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 The issue of choice of defendants is also bound up with the ideas 
of standing.148 In Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reviewed a permanent injunction granted to an environ-
mental organization against a forest-products company to prevent 
logging in an old-growth forest used by the marbled murrelet for nest-
ing.149 Appellants argued that the district court had erred in finding a 
violation of the take provisions, since no logging had yet occurred, 
and therefore no harm had yet befallen the murrelet.150 The circuit 
court rejected this argument, saying the future harm to come from 
their logging was sufficient to support the take finding, since the de-
struction of habitat was a “reasonably certain threat of imminent 
harm” that would cause a disruption of essential behavioral patterns, 
including breeding, sheltering, and nesting.151 
2. Standing 
 As explained in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court 
has developed a three-part test to satisfy the standing requirement 
present in all civil suits, whether or not under the ESA.152 First, the 
plaintiff must establish injury in fact.153 A plaintiff must next show a 
causal nexus between her harms and the defendant’s conduct.154 Fi-
nally, a plaintiff must show that her injury is likely to be redressed by 
                                                                                                                      
148 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272–73 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005); see also discussion infra Part II.C.2.b–c. 
149 Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 1996). Forest Conservation 
Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co. had previously held that the very purpose of the ESA required 
that injunction be available to prevent imminent threats of harm. 50 F.3d 781, 785 (9th 
Cir. 1995). 
150 Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1064 (noting appellants’ contention that Sweet Home re-
quired actual harm before a court could find a take to have occurred). 
151 Id. at 1064–66 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 
U.S. 694 (1994) and Rosboro Lumber, 50 F.3d at 781). Relatedly, in American Electric Power Co., 
defendants—being sued to abate the public nuisance caused by their contribution to cli-
mate change—were a group of power companies, who together emit twenty-five percent of 
power industry emissions and a full ten percent of anthropogenic CO2 emissions in the 
United States. 406 F. Supp. 2d at 268. Though the court dismissed the case for presenting 
a nonjusdiciable political question, the choice of defendants was particularly well-made, 
because the group of defendants together allegedly contributes so significantly to the 
problem complained of. See id.; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. 
Power Co., No. 05-5104cv (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2005); Complaint of State Plaintiffs at ¶¶ 2, 
100, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 04 Civ. 5669 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 21, 2004). 
152 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
153 Id. at 560; see Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 206. 
154 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
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the relief requested of the court.155 These requirements are in place 
to assure that sufficiently interested parties take part in suits to “en-
sure the proper adversarial presentation . . . .”156 
a. Injury in Fact 
 Plaintiffs must show particularized injury in fact, whether actual 
or imminent.157 Harms shared equally by a large number of the gen-
eral public would not satisfy this requirement.158 However, Massachu-
setts v. EPA explained that, at least for State plaintiffs, a generalized, 
widespread harm would not preclude standing because, at the state 
level, such seemingly widespread harm—loss of wide swaths of coastal 
land—is actually a particularized injury to the state as a landowner.159 
The Court also noted that the increasing severity of the injury over 
the next century could lead to severe economic injury in terms of 
remediation and protection costs.160 
 In Lujan, plaintiff-naturalists claimed that they were injured by 
overseas harm to endangered species because they had once and 
would one-day again travel to visit the imperiled species.161 The Court 
found the alleged harm to lack the imminence of injury required, 
absent concrete plans that were or would be thwarted.162 That is, had 
the plaintiff-naturalists already bought plane tickets and planned itin-
eraries including visiting the imperiled species, Justice Scalia sug-
gested that this case could have come out the other way.163 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly ruled on visitor standing, hold-
ing in Idaho Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt that plaintiff-intervenors 
                                                                                                                      
155 Id. at 561. 
156 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 
157 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
158 Id. at 560–62; see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522. 
159 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522 (“[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely 
shared, the Court has found injury in fact.”) (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 
U.S. 11, 24 (1998)) (internal quotations omitted). Such coastal land is also piping plover 
habitat. See Endangered and Threatened Species, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (2007); Hecht et 
al., supra note 71, at 2, 6. 
160 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522. 
161 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64. 
162 See id. at 564; Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 206. But see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
582 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“[A] person who has visited the critical habitat 
of an endangered species has a professional interest in preserving the species and its habi-
tat, and intends to revisit them in the future has standing to challenge agency action that 
threatens their destruction.”). 
163 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564. 
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satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement “by showing that group members 
have direct contact with the environmental subject matter . . . .”164 
b. Causation 
 To satisfy standing, a plaintiff must next show a causal connection 
between her injury and the defendant’s conduct.165 Though this is 
not as stringent a requirement as the eventual proximate cause in-
quiry that a court must execute, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 
her injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s actions.166 For exam-
ple, the appellant lumber companies’ planned lumbering in Marbled 
Murrelet was fairly traceable to the injury complained of, namely that 
deforestation would harm the species’ breeding and sheltering—that 
is, deforestation would harm the species.167 At this early point in ESA 
litigation, plaintiffs need only show that there is a substantial likeli-
hood that the harm is caused by the defendant’s actions.168 
c. Redressability 
 Finally, a plaintiff must show that the relief requested will, to a 
significantly likely degree, ameliorate the injury complained of.169 Jus-
tice Scalia wrote for the plurality in Lujan that a requested injunction 
would have limited usefulness due to actors outside the reach of the 
Court, thus finding that plaintiffs lacked standing because of a failure 
of redressability.170 However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens 
opined that, though the immediate harm would not necessarily be 
reached, the Court’s influence on agency heads would lead to influ-
ence internationally, as foreign projects would conform to the re-
                                                                                                                      
164 Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1995). 
165 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. Traditionally, the Supreme Court dealt with both causa-
tion and the next requirement, redressibility, as one analysis. Erwin Chemerinsky, Con-
stitutional Law: Principles and Policies 75–76 (3d ed. 2006). Originally, the Court 
considered that the purpose of the causation requirement was to make sure that any action 
taken to limit a defendant’s activities would actually redress the injury, thus conflating the 
two requirements. See id. Recent case law, however, suggests that they ought to be consid-
ered to be separate functions of the standing requirement, each deserving of its own in-
quiry. See id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 
166 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168–69 (1997); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Stan. 
Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 207. 
167 Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 1997). 
168 Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 207 (citing Fla. Key Deer v. Stickney, 864 F. 
Supp. 1222, 1226 (S.D. Fla. 1994)). 
169 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525–26 (2007); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; Stan. 
Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 207–08. 
170 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568–71 (plurality opinion). 
2009] Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act 295 
quirements of U.S. law in order to keep their American contracts.171 
As such, Justice Stevens believed the plaintiff’s harms were redressible 
by the Court, and would have found that the plaintiffs had satisfied 
this prong of the standing requirements.172 
 Massachusetts v. EPA highlighted the common-sense idea that, 
though a harm could not be completely redressed by the Court’s ac-
tion, a plaintiff would not be barred from pursuing his suit.173 There, 
the Court held that though “regulating motor-vehicle emissions will 
not by itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we lack 
jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or 
reduce it.”174 The Court held that though a complete amelioration is 
impossible, it could still offer relief from some portion of the harm.175 
In fact, the Court concluded, “‘a plaintiff satisfies the redressability 
requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a 
discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a favorable decision 
will relieve his every injury.’” 176 Justice Stevens also eviscerated the 
EPA’s attempt to hide behind India and China, refuting its claim that 
because the newly industrialized countries will produce an increasing 
amount of greenhouse gases, regulation at home would do little to 
redress Massachusetts’s injury.177 Noting that “[a] reduction in domes-
tic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no 
matter what happens elsewhere,” thus at least partially ameliorating 
the risk of “catastrophic harm” to the Massachusetts coast, the Court 
held that plaintiffs satisfied the redressability requirement.178 
3. Justiciability and the Political Question Doctrine 
 Environmental cases can implicate hard decisions in waters the 
courts despair of dipping their toes.179 Global warming cases in par-
ticular have, until recently, frightened the federal courts away from 
                                                                                                                      
171 See id. at 584–85 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
172 See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
173 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 525. 
174 Id. 
175 See id. 
176 Id. (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.15 (1982)). 
177 See id at 525–26. 
178 Id. at 526. It is important to note, though, that this opinion has muddied the waters 
slightly, because in its section on injury, the injury was the loss of coast line. See id. at 522–
23. In its redressibility section, the Court speaks of the injury as the “risk of catastrophic 
harm,” not the harm itself. See id at 525–26. 
179 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271–73 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (dismissing the case as a nonjusticiable political question). 
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coming to potentially far-reaching decisions, or have taken a back seat 
to more immediate, pressing interests.180 Though Massachusetts v. EPA 
certainly seems to have put this issue to rest with regard to climate 
change, there is still the possibility that a suit involving climate change 
could trigger an argument that the suit presents a nonjusticiable po-
litical question.181 
 The political question doctrine is steeped in the notion of separa-
tion of powers.182 When a question arises that is best left to the politi-
cal branches because of their constitutionally granted authorities, 
general expertise, or fact-finding powers beyond those of the courts, 
the question is to be left to those branches to take up at their discre-
tion.183 Though the Court in Baker v. Carr set out a list of six instances 
where a political question may be implicated, only two are relevant 
here: “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving [the suit]; [and] the impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion 
. . . .”184 These instances are relevant because they are the two most 
likely to exclude a climate change suit—whether under the ESA or 
otherwise—because of the far-reaching, economically tied causes and 
effects.185 
 The Supreme Court has applied the political question doctrine in 
limited, discrete areas: “[T]he republican form of government clause 
and the electoral process, foreign affairs, Congress’s ability to regulate 
its internal processes, the process for ratifying constitutional amend-
ments, instances where the federal court cannot shape effective equitable relief, 
and the impeachment process.”186 The penultimate of these, “instances 
where the federal court cannot shape effective equitable relief,” is the 
                                                                                                                      
180 See id.; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (noting that nothing 
in the case suggested a nonjusticiable political question); NRDC v. Kempthrone II, No. 
1:05-cv-1207, 2007 WL 1989015, at *14–15 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2007) (subjugating concerns 
about an inadequate biological opinion that failed to take climate change into account to 
the very real, very immediate possibility of widespread water shortages and crop failure). 
But see NRDC v. Kempthorne I, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 367–69 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (taking climate 
change, the ESA, and compelling water-user interests head-on). 
181 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 271–
73. 
182 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962); see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–78 
(2004). 
183 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210–11; Chemerinsky, supra note 165, at 132. 
184 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 271–73. Though this 
list is often quoted in political question cases, scholars bemoan its limited usefulness. See 
Chemerinsky, supra note 165, at 131. 
185 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 271–73. 
186 Chemerinsky, supra note 165, at 131 (emphasis added). 
2009] Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act 297 
instance of the doctrine that climate change litigation would be most 
likely to implicate, as it did in one recent case.187 
 In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., several states, a city, 
and land trusts brought suit against major emitters of greenhouse 
gases to abate the public nuisance of global warming.188 The court, 
sitting essentially in equity, considered that it had to “strike a balance 
‘between interests seeking strict schemes to reduce pollution rapidly 
to eliminate its social costs and interests advancing the economic con-
cern that strict schemes [will] retard industrial development with at-
tendant social costs.’”189 The court claimed that it could not commit 
such a balancing without first coming to an “initial policy determina-
tion” regarding the relative weight of those interests.190 Citing the de-
fendants’ memorandum, the court noted several of the initial policy 
determinations that would need to be made by the court: 
[G]iven the numerous contributors of greenhouse gases, 
should the societal costs of reducing such emissions be 
borne by just a segment of the electricity-generating industry 
and their industrial and other consumers? 
 Should those costs be spread across the entire electricity-
generating industry (including utilities in the plaintiff 
States)? Other industries? 
 . . . . 
 What are the implications for the nation’s energy inde-
pendence and, by extension, its national security?191 
Additionally, the court seemed to implicate congressional and execu-
tive inaction, noting that statements made by executive and congres-
sional officials regarding a policy of greenhouse gas reduction did not 
constitute clear statements of policy, as “policy is expressed by statutes 
. . . not press releases.”192 
                                                                                                                      
187 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 271–73; Chemerinsky, supra note 165, at 
131, 147–48; see also Erin Casper Borissov, Note, Global Warming: A Questionable Use of the 
Political Question Doctrine, 41 Ind. L. Rev. 415, 445–49 (2008). 
188 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267. 
189 Id. at 272 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
847 (1984)). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 273; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 165, at 133 (“The argument is that in 
certain cases an effective remedy would require judicial oversight of day-to-day executive 
or legislative conduct.”). 
192 Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274; Borissov, supra note 187, at 447. However, 
as this is a relatively stale case in light of Massachusetts v. EPA—and has since been ap-
pealed—it is possible that current congressional and executive hearings, statements, and 
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III.  A Suit Enjoining an Increase in and Ordering a  
Reduction of CO2 Emissions Under Section 9  
of the Endangered Species Act 
 The ESA is a powerful species-protection tool that can be used 
both prospectively to enjoin future harm, and retrospectively to halt 
prior and ongoing harm.193 Harm to endangered and threatened spe-
cies is to be prevented without regard to cost of implementation or 
other balancing of conflicting policies.194 As such, local private citi-
zens and naturalists should be able to successfully bring suit against 
those contributing to rapid anthropogenic climate change through 
the release of CO2 on the basis that such climate change harms or 
risks harming coastal threatened species—specifically, the western 
snowy plover and the piping plover—in the habitat-rich states of Cali-
fornia, Oregon, Washington, and Massachusetts.195 The suit should 
seek both to enjoin increases in CO2 emissions caused by bringing 
online new dirty power plants or increasing production at existing 
                                                                                                                      
even statutes could give a case based on the ESA’s sweeping take provisions and harms 
caused by climate change its day in court. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 15, 40, 42, 
and 46 U.S.C.); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525–26 (2007); Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 
F. Supp. 2d at 265. See generally Oversight Hearing, supra note 2 (providing testimony and 
congressmen’s statements regarding climate change); H.R. 6 Press Release, supra note 8 
(containing President Bush’s remarks on a future “cleaner” nation). Massachusetts v. EPA 
also “attach[ed] considerable significance to EPA’s ‘agree[ment] with the President that 
“we must address the issue of global climate change,”’” suggesting a willingness to count 
executive and administration statements as declarations of policy. 549 U.S. at 526 (quoting 
Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, Notice of Denial of Peti-
tion for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,929 (Sept. 8, 2003)). 
193 See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 1996) (prospective); 
Palila II, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1082–83 (D. Haw. 1986), aff’d, 852 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 
1988) (retrospective and ongoing harm); Boudreaux, supra note 24, at 750–52 (“The teeth 
of the ESA’s section 9 . . . are found in its empowerment of plaintiffs to enjoin conduct 
before it occurs.”). 
194 See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2000) (prohibition of 
take); Sinden, supra note 86, at 1411–12. 
195 See § 1538(a)(1)(B); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564–66 (1992); 
Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1064; Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1395, 
1398 (9th Cir. 1995); Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 
785 (9th Cir. 1995); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 
(2007) (definition of “harm”); § 17.11(h) (listing range of threatened western snowy plov-
ers as Pacific Coast; range of threatened piping plovers as Atlantic Coast); Stan. Envtl. L. 
Soc’y, supra note 81, at 202–04 (discussing bringing suit and categories of causes of ac-
tion). There are likely as many such ESA suits as there are coastal endangered or threat-
ened animal species. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h); discussion infra Parts III.A–D. 
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plants, and order a reduction in such emissions by the defendant 
power-producers throughout the United States.196 
A. Parties to the Litigation 
 Such a suit, under the take provisions of section 9 and citizen suit 
provisions of section 11 of the ESA,197 could have a number of plaintiffs, 
as well as myriad defendants.198 Private individuals, particularly those 
studying or accustomed to observing the plovers, are especially well-
positioned to act as plaintiffs.199 Thus, birdwatchers, habitat-visitors, and 
naturalists should join the suit, both in the west-coast habitats of the 
snowy plover and in the Massachusetts habitat of the piping plover.200 
 As power generation accounts for much of the CO2 expelled into 
the atmosphere,201 utility companies are an obvious target of this type 
of litigation.202 Targeting groups of power producers that generate a 
                                                                                                                      
196 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268–69 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005); Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 62 (statement of Bill McKibben) (regarding 150 
new coal-fired power plants in some stage of development in the United States); Stan. 
Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 109 (discussing the form of an ESA case based on the 
harm vein of the take provisions); Boudreaux, supra note 24, at 750–52. 
197 §§ 1538(a)(1)(B), 1540(g)(1)(A) (respectively). 
198 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007); Green Mountain Chrysler 
Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 300–01 (D. Vt. 2007); Am. Elec. 
Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 268–69. 
199 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that visitors of 
threatened wildlife could be plaintiffs in an ESA suit); Idaho Farm Bureau, 58 F.3d at 1395, 
1397–99 (holding a group of intervenors could show injury based on living in the state of 
the species, visiting the specific area of the species, or studying the species); Stan. Envtl. 
L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 206–07 (citing Idaho Farm Bureau). Though states—for example 
California, Oregon, Washington, and Massachusetts—could also make good plaintiffs, as 
could environmental or bird watcher organizations, this Note will focus on taking advan-
tage of many similarly situated local, private attorneys general. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. at 522–23 (state standing in climate change suit); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (citizen 
suits); Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 460 F.3d 1125, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 
2006) (conservation organizations); NRDC v. Kempthorne I, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 328–29 
(E.D. Cal. 2007); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h); see also NRDC: Our Conservation Victories, supra 
note 144. 
Additionally, as Professor Ruhl notes, USFWS probably has little stomach for such a 
politically charged suit, and he dismisses the likelihood of such a suit being prosecuted. See 
Ruhl, supra note 51, at 41–42 (citing Rasband, supra note 135). Professor Ruhl does not, 
however, consider citizen suits, except in that they likewise face difficult evidentiary and 
causation hurdles. Id. at 40–41. Such citizen groups do not, however, have the same politi-
cal pressures against them, and, as such, are better able to withstand potential failure, hav-
ing less distance to fall. See id. at 40–42. 
200 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562; Idaho Farm Bureau, 58 F.3d at 1398; 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h); 
Hecht et al., supra note 71, at 6–7; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, at 7–8. 
201 Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 309; IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
202 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 268–69. 
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large share of the nation’s energy and, therefore, CO2 emissions, would 
allow plaintiffs to draw connections to the destructive harm occurring 
on the coasts, where the effects are particularly pronounced.203 
B. Allegations, Remedies Requested, Venue and Jurisdiction 
 In bringing a suit under sections 9 and 11 of the ESA, plaintiffs 
will have to allege a take of endangered or threatened species, specifi-
cally, the western snowy plover and the piping plover.204 For purposes 
of this suit, the term “take” should focus on its definition as “harm” to 
an endangered or threatened species.205 Harm, as defined by regula-
tion and confirmed by Supreme Court and circuit court decisions, 
means “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife.” 206  The suit 
should focus on “harm” where acts “include significant habitat modi-
fication or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by sig-
nificantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, 
feeding or sheltering.”207 
 Specifically, plaintiffs should allege that actions taken by defen-
dant power companies have constituted a take of threatened plover 
species, since by their contribution to anthropogenic climate change 
and resulting sea-level rise, these companies have harmed, or threaten 
imminent harm to, the plovers by significantly impairing their ability 
                                                                                                                      
203 See id. at 268; Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 62 (statement of Bill McKibben); 
IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 4–5; Complaint of State Plaintiffs at ¶¶ 98–100, Connecticut v. 
Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 04 Civ. 5669 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 21, 2004); see also Hecht et al., supra 
note 71, at 2, 6; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, at 2, 7–8. Whether automobile and truck 
manufacturers could be added to the suit, or whether Congress’s recent regulation consti-
tutes an occupation of the field that could trigger a nonjusticiable political question is not 
considered in this Note. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 § 102(b)(2) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 15, 40, 42, and 46 
U.S.C.) (setting corporate average fuel economy standards at thirty-five miles per gallon by 
model-year 2020); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961) (“[T]extually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department” yields a non-
justiciable political question.); Chemerinsky, supra note 165, at 131, 147–48 (discussing a 
limit on judicial oversight under the political question doctrine where review would un-
necessarily interfere with the political branches’ powers). 
204 See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B), 1540(g)(1)(A) (2000) (sec-
tions 9 and 16, respectively); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (listing the western snowy plover, a Cali-
fornia, Oregon, and Washington coastal threatened species, and the piping plover, a Massa-
chusetts coastal threatened species); Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 109. 
205 See § 1532(19); Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 91–92 (statement of Dr. Ken Cal-
deira); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h); IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 9, 12. 
206 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (definitions); see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a 
Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704–05 (1995); Palila II Aff., 852 F.2d 1106, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
207 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (definition of “harm”) (emphasis added). 
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to breed, feed, or shelter in their traditional habitats.208 Inundation of 
traditional plover habitat on both coasts by rising waters, coupled with 
shorelines so developed as to prevent adequate adaptation, will de-
stroy plover habitat, thus injuring their ability to breed, feed, and shel-
ter.209 
 To help avoid such a fate for the threatened plovers, plaintiffs 
should request an injunction against the defendant power companies 
requiring them to reduce their CO2 emissions.210 Such an injunction 
would include an order not to increase power production from high-
CO2-emitting plants, and also a prohibition against bringing new coal-
powered plants online, as both of these would continue to fuel an-
thropogenic climate change, harming the coastal plovers.211 
                                                                                                                      
208 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B); Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 704–05; Forest Conservation 
Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1995); Palila II, 649 F. Supp. 
1070, 1075–76 (D. Haw. 1986), aff’d, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988); Oversight Hearing, supra 
note 2, at 91–92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3; Hecht et al., supra 
note 71, at 6, 11 (noting coastal habitat between dunes and high-tide line for sheltering 
and breeding, and intertidal beaches and wrack-lines for feeding); IPCC Report, supra note 
2, at 9, 12. 
209 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522–23 (2007) (noting the concrete harm of 
loss of coastal land); Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 92 (statement of Ken Caldeira) 
(noting that the built-up coasts leave coastal ecosystems no retreat from the pounding 
surf); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (listing piping plover’s habitat in coastal Atlantic states); 
Hecht et al., supra note 71, at 2, 6. 
210 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(discussing the request for an injunction to abate a public nuisance, which was not de-
cided because of the political question doctrine); Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 
213–15 (citing Hill v. TVA, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1383 
(9th Cir. 1987)). 
211 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 91–92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira); Hecht 
et al., supra note 71, at 2, 6; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, at 2, 7–8; Stan. Envtl. L. 
Soc’y, supra note 81, at 213–15; IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 9, 12. Whether plaintiffs could 
successfully also obtain a preliminary injunction to so enjoin defendants while the suit 
makes its way through the courts is outside the scope of this Note. 
Additionally, there is a question of venue in such a suit: though plaintiffs are explicitly 
authorized to bring suit under the ESA in Federal District Court, the ESA allows suit in 
whichever district a harm occurs. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(c), (g)(3)(A) (“Any suit under this 
subsection may be brought in the judicial district in which the violation occurs.”) (empha-
sis added). Since the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals arguably has the most experience 
with ESA harm cases, and an enormous portion of the Pacific coast western snowy plover’s 
habitat falls within that circuit, it would behoove the plaintiffs to file suit in a California 
District Court. See § 1540(g)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h); Hornaday et al., supra note 71, 
at 2, 7–8; Boudreaux, supra note 24, at 750–51. See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 
(1997) (Oregon); Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 460 F.3d 1125 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (Washington); Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996) (Cali-
fornia); NRDC v. Kempthorne I, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (California). Whether 
this could open the suit to being split—with Massachusetts and claims relating to the pip-
 
302 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:273 
C. Standing of the Plaintiffs 
 Plaintiffs should be able to satisfy standing to survive early mo-
tions to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.212 As 
discussed supra, this will include alleging (1) injury in fact; (2) a 
causal nexus between that injury and the defendant’s actions; and (3) 
a significant likelihood that the injury complained of would be re-
dressed by the relief requested.213 
1. Injury in Fact 
 The plaintiffs to this suit should have little difficulty showing in-
jury in fact, both ongoing and imminent.214 A warming, rising sea is 
and will continue to inundate plover habitat, thus reducing the spe-
cies’s ability to breed, feed, and shelter, potentially injuring individual 
specimens and the species’s ability to propagate a new brood.215 
 Local, private birdwatchers or other conservationists should be 
able to show injury under Lujan.216 As the Lujan Court states, “the de-
sire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic pur-
poses, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.”217 
Here, this “cognizable interest” would be observation or conservation 
of the threatened animal; as such, harm to the animal through habitat 
destruction directly thwarts this interest.218 To be sure to avoid the 
problem of the plaintiffs in Lujan—that is, failing to show imminent 
injury because of a lack of concrete plans to visit the endangered spe-
                                                                                                                      
ing plover severed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
212 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–26 (2007); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 165, at 60–62; Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 205–06. 
213 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521–26; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560–61 (1992); Chemerinsky, supra note 165, at 60–62; Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra 
note 81, at 206–09; see also discussion supra Part II.C.2. 
214 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522–23; Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 91–92 
(statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira); Endangered and Threatened Species, 50 C.F.R. § 
17.11(h) (2007); IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 9, 12. 
215 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (defining “harm” as an act that injures wildlife by “significantly 
impairing . . . breeding, feeding or sheltering”); Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 49 
(statement of Dr. J. Christopher Haney) (“Projections of sea level rise from global warming 
range from 7 to 23 inches over the next century . . . .”); Hecht et al., supra note 71, at 
2, 6; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, at 2, 7–8; IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 1, 9 (“Rising 
sea level is consistent with warming . . . .”). 
216 See 504 U.S. at 564; Chemerinsky, supra note 165, at 69–70. 
217 504 U.S. at 562–63. 
218  See id.; Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 49 (statement of Dr. J. Christopher 
Haney); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h). 
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cies—the individuals should be locally based, with a documented his-
tory of visiting the plovers and a definite, demonstrable plan to con-
tinue doing so, but for their injury.219 Furthermore, as coastal Cali-
fornians ostensibly enjoy the aesthetics of their rugged coast, with the 
various animals inhabiting the intertidal and dune zones, such people 
as plaintiffs should be able to show that an inundation of these zones 
harms their aesthetic enjoyment of plovers in their habitat.220 
 Defendants’ best argument against Plaintiffs’ standing here is an 
argument against the alleged injury itself as harm comprising a 
take.221 That is, Defendants would likely argue that there is not yet 
documented harm or death to the plovers, and that, as such, no take 
could be committed and no injury to the Plaintiffs is possible. 222 
However, as Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources 
(Palila II ) reminds us, no actual finding of death or even imminent 
harm is required to find harm, or therefore, a take.223 Thus, Plaintiffs 
ought to be able to show injury in fact, based on the pending or cur-
rent harm to the plovers as their habitat is inundated, and they are 
prevented or hindered in breeding, feeding, or sheltering.224 
2. Causation 
 The various plaintiffs should also be able to show that their inju-
ries are fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant power compa-
nies.225 The defendant power companies burn various fossil fuels to 
provide electricity.226 As Dr. Ken Caldeira noted in his statement to 
                                                                                                                      
219 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64. 
220 See id. at 562–64, 582 (Stevens, J., concurring); Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 
58 F.3d 1392, 1395, 1397–99 (9th Cir. 1995) (injury based on living in the state of the spe-
cies and visiting the specific area of the species, or studying the species); Hecht et al., 
supra note 71, at 2, 6; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, at 2, 7–8. 
221 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697–98 
(1995); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (definitions). 
222 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697–98. 
223 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (D. Haw. 1986), aff’d, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). 
224 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697–98; Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1075; 50 C.F.R. § 17.3; 
Hecht et al., supra note 71, at 2, 6; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, at 2, 7–8; Stan. 
Envtl. Law Soc’y, supra note 81, at 109–10. 
225 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523–24 (2007) (“EPA does not dispute the 
existence of a causal connection between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global 
warming.”); Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 62 (statement of Bill McKibben); id. at 90 
(statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira); IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 4–6. 
226 Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 
339 (D. Vt. 2007) (“Vermont . . . participat[es] in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
. . . an agreement among nine Northeast and mid-Atlantic states to adopt a regional cap 
and trade program for GHG emissions associated with large stationary sources such as power 
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Congress, “[w]hen we burn coal, oil or gas, we release carbon dioxide 
into the atmosphere.”227 This, in turn, causes sea level rise through 
thermal expansion of the water itself and the melting of terrestrial ice 
sheets due to global warming.228 Such sea level rise causes the direct 
harm to plovers and inundates the coastlines, and as such is fairly 
traceable to the plaintiffs’ injuries.229 
 Defendants would likely argue that it is not merely their emis-
sions that contribute to the plaintiffs’ injuries, but rather all emitters 
world-wide.230 However, both the Supreme Court and the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Vermont have declared that even incremental 
steps to alleviate a harm are sufficient to support the requisite causal 
nexus for standing. 231 Since power producers make a “meaningful 
contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence . . . to 
global warming,” and since such warming causes the sea-level rise that 
causes the injuries that plaintiffs complain of, plaintiffs should be able 
to demonstrate a fairly traceable nexus.232 
                                                                                                                      
plants.”) (emphasis added); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Complaint of State Plaintiffs at ¶¶ 98–102, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. 
Power Co., No. 04 Civ. 5669 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 21, 2004). 
227 Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 90 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira). 
228 Id. at 64 (statement of Bill McKibben) (“[T]he natural world was fairly well bal-
anced for carbon before the injection of anthropogenic CO2 . . . .”); id. at 91–92 (state-
ment of Dr. Ken Caldeira) (predicting sea-level rise due to thermal expansion and melting 
ice sheets); IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 1 (“Rising sea level is consistent with warming 
. . . .”); see discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
229 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 523–26; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168–69 
(1997); Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 90–92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira). 
230 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 525–26; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 
at 273 (regarding segment of power industry bearing costs of global emissions); Oversight 
Hearing, supra note 2, at 90 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira). 
231 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 525–26 (“[The EPA’s] argument rests on the erro-
neous assumption that a small incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be 
attacked in a federal judicial forum.”); Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 309 
(“Moreover, the Court noted the legitimacy of small and incremental regulatory steps 
. . . .”) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, supra). Though Green Mountain Chrysler speaks of regu-
lation of auto emissions, the point remains valid for incremental steps and impacts. The 
Supreme Court noted that auto emissions represent less than one-third of the nation’s 
CO2 emissions, which alone would place the United States behind only Europe and China 
in terms of emissions; U.S. power plant emissions represent fully ten percent of worldwide 
anthropogenic emissions of all kinds. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 524–26; Am. Elec. 
Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 268. Additionally, though the Massachusetts v. EPA Court at-
tached significant importance to EPA being an agency, and therefore accustomed to work-
ing incrementally, there is no reason to believe that the power production industry 
couldn’t be expected to decrease its emissions company-by-company, thus achieving a simi-
lar incremental effect. See 127 S. Ct. at 1457–58; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 268. 
232 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 524–25. 
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3. Redressibility 
 Plaintiffs to this suit should also be able to satisfy the final re-
quirement for standing, that of redressibility.233 They will be able to 
show that their injuries will be redressed by the relief requested.234 
 Specifically, the plaintiffs’ injuries—imminent harm to plover 
habitats from a rise in sea level caused by climate change—could be 
redressed—avoided or mitigated—by preventing additional coal-
burning plants from coming online and requiring a diminution in car-
bon emissions from defendant power companies.235 Though all sources 
of CO2 are in some way contributing to the rise in sea level— and as 
such defendant power companies are not alone in their contribution— 
the requested injunction need not reverse climate change.236 As the Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA Court explained, a favorable decision need not relieve 
a plaintiff’s “every injury.”237 The Court found that, as here, the relief 
requested would “to some extent” reduce the very real harm done to 
petitioners, both the already-extant rise in sea levels inundating the 
Massachusetts coast and the “risk of catastrophic harm.”238 That regula-
tion of CO2 would not “solve” global warming and the resulting catas-
trophic coastal injuries did not preclude finding redressibility.239 Here, 
then, there is no reason to preclude standing because the requested 
injunction would not cease all or most CO2 emission.240 
D. No Political Question Presented 
 This case should not be barred under the political question doc-
trine as in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., because the plaintiffs 
would not be asking the court to make an initial policy decision, as 
warned against in Baker v. Carr. 241 In American Electric Power Co., the 
                                                                                                                      
233 See id. at 525–26. 
234 See id.; Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 207–09. 
235 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 525–26. 
236 See id. 
237 Id. (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.15 (1982)). 
238 Id.(“[T]he rise in sea levels associated with global warming has already harmed and 
will continue to harm Massachusetts. The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is 
nevertheless real. That risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the 
relief they seek.”). 
239 Id. 
240 See id. The Court also found it particularly relevant that EPA had already noted the 
pressing concerns of global warming, and its support of voluntary emission-reduction pro-
grams to strengthen its decision that EPA could redress the problem. Id. 
241 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (listing six criteria which may trigger a 
finding of a nonjudiciable political question); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. 
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court decided that it could not consider the case because it would be 
forced to balance economic, environmental, foreign policy, and na-
tional security interests, deciding that such balancing implicated the 
political question doctrine.242 Under the ESA, however, no such balanc-
ing is supposed to take place.243 In passing the ESA, Congress made 
clear that “the balance has been struck in favor of affording endan-
gered species the highest of priorities . . . .”244 As such, the balance 
that the Southern District of New York feared it was unable to strike in 
American Electric Power Co. has been clearly struck in favor of endan-
gered or threatened species.245 Therefore, no initial policy determina-
tion as to the priority given defendant power companies versus the 
plaintiffs and the threatened plovers is required.246 The case should 
therefore not be barred as a nonjusticiable political question.247 
 Defendants could also argue that such a determination unduly 
interferes with the coordinate branches of the government, making 
the far-reaching policy decisions based on the ESA outside of its Arti-
cle III powers.248 Plaintiffs should respond that the court is merely 
                                                                                                                      
Supp. 2d 265, 272–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 28, Connecticut v. 
Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 05-5104cv (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2005). 
242 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274. 
243 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194–95 (1978); see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698–99 (1995); Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 167–68 
(1st Cir. 1997); supra note 91 and accompanying text; see also Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra 
note 81, at 22. 
244 Hill, 437 U.S. at 194. 
245 See id.; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274. 
246 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (finding no political question 
defect in a wildly complicated global warming suit to compel the EPA to regulate CO2); 
Hill, 437 U.S. at 194; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274; Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 28, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 05-5104cv (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 
2005). In addition to speeches and press releases, policy decisions as to the importance of 
regulating CO2 emissions have been announced both in agency regulations and in statu-
tory enactment. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 
121 Stat. 1492 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 15, 40, 42, and 46 U.S.C.); Control of 
Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, Notice of Denial of Petition for Rule-
making, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,929 (Sept. 8, 2003). The Federal Register notice has been 
credited by the Supreme Court as announcing settled policy, effectively wiping away the 
Southern District of New York’s declaration in American Electric Power Co. that policy is 
made solely through statutes and treaties in force. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 526; 
Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274. The latter statutory enactment—the law—is, of 
course, a pronouncement of policy as an act of Congress. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 
2d at 274 (“[O]fficial United States policy is expressed by statutes . . . in force . . . .”). 
247 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274; 
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 28–35, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 05-5104cv 
(2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2005). 
248 See U.S. Const. art. III; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274. 
2009] Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act 307 
deciding a case, its particularized result impacting only the parties to 
the matter.249 Defendants, through their lobby, would then be at their 
leisure to petition the administration to equalize the rest of the indus-
try’s emissions with their own.250 
E. Causation Satisfiable 
 After passing all of the constitutional hurdles to bring the suit, 
plaintiffs still need to show that the defendant power producers’ ac-
tions are both the actual and the legal cause of their injuries.251 Tradi-
tionally, plaintiffs would need to show that, but for the defendants’ 
actions, the harm to plovers—destruction of the plovers’ habitat 
through coastal inundation caused by sea-level rise—would not oc-
cur.252 However, Massachusetts v. EPA acknowledges that even a pre-
liminary, tentative step toward remediation exposes links in the causal 
chain and therefore traces the harm to the defendant.253 Thus, in a 
case involving plovers, the fact that but for Defendant’s actions, harm 
would still befall the plovers does not necessarily defeat cause-in-fact, 
as some movement toward remediation is sufficient.254 
                                                                                                                      
249 See U.S. Const. art. III; Chemerinsky, supra note 165, at 75 (discussing redressibil-
ity as having the desired impact on the parties); Borissov, supra note 187, at 445 (“[A] judi-
cial determination of whether defendants’ [CO2] emissions amount to an unreasonable 
interference with a public right does not impinge upon the executive or legislative 
branches. Such a decision would apply only to the specific parties in the case, and any 
relief would likewise be limited.”). 
250 See U.S. Const. amend. I; Borissov, supra note 187, at 445. 
251 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697–98 
(1995); id. at 708–09 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (limiting application of the harm provi-
sion to cases where proximate cause can be shown); see also Cheever, supra note 120, at 
179–84. 
252 See Rasband, supra note 135, at 599. 
253 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523–24 (2007) (discussing even incremental 
contribution to climate change as sufficiently traceable to defendants and justiciable as 
cause-in-fact). Though this discussion was in relation to agency action, which moves in-
crementally by nature, it is not at all inappropriate to bring this interpretation to ESA citi-
zen suits, where citizens are encouraged to act as private attorneys general. See Stan. 
Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 202 (citing Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997)). 
But see Polar Bear Press Release, supra note 10, at 6 (noting that USFWS Director Dale Hall 
is to issue guidance to his staff that “the best scientific data available today cannot make a 
causal connection between harm to listed species or their habitats and greenhouse gas 
emissions from a specific facility, or resource development project or government action.”) 
(emphasis added). Since the action proposed in this Note speaks of aggregate CO2 emis-
sions from several power producers, and not from a “specific facility,” Director Hall’s guid-
ance is probably only mildly relevant. See id.; supra Part III.A. 
254 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 523–24; Rasband, supra note 135, at 598–99. But 
see Ruhl, supra note 51, at 41–42 (noting the problems of joint and several liability causing 
a diffuse causal chain in climate change suits). 
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 Furthermore, the take of the plovers through the harm to their 
habitats is a foreseeable consequence of defendants’ actions in con-
tributing to climate change through their CO2 emissions from power 
production, thus also satisfying the proximate cause requirement.255 
While defendants may be able to argue—perhaps straight-facedly— 
that current sea level rise was not a foreseeable consequence of CO2 
emissions because of ongoing debate over causes of climate change 
and attendant environmental effects, they will be hard-pressed to ar-
gue that bringing additional coal-burning plants online, increasing 
production, or failing to reduce CO2 output will not foreseeably con-
tribute to sea level rise.256 As such, plaintiffs should be able to show 
defendants’ actions are proximate causes of the harm befalling 
coastal plover habitat.257 
Conclusion 
 A suit under the ESA with the intent of limiting CO2 emissions is 
an admittedly crude tool that would require a liberal activist court to 
succeed fully. Surely, the political branches should take real action to 
force reduction in emissions of all greenhouse gases. While we have 
seen some small steps towards this goal, our politically responsible 
national leaders must do more if they are to prevent widespread harm 
to this and other countries. Since the political branches have not yet 
done so, the ESA provides ample opportunity for citizen attorneys 
general who are serious about combating causes of the very real, very 
imminent scourges of anthropogenic climate change. 
                                                                                                                      
255 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700 n.13; Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 62 (statement 
of Bill McKibben); id. at 90–92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira); IPCC Report, supra note 2, 
at 1, 9; Stan. Envtl. L. Soc’y, supra note 81, at 109; Boudreaux, supra note 24, at 748–50; 
Rasband, supra note 135, at 598–99; supra Part III.C.1. 
256 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516–19; Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth 
Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 313–14 (D. Vt. 2007); Connecticut v. Am. 
Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, 
at 62 (statement of Bill McKibben); id. at 90–92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira); Hecht 
et al., supra note 71, at 2, 6; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, at 2, 7–8; IPCC Report, supra 
note 2, at 1, 9. 
257 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516–19; Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 62 
(statement of Bill McKibben); id. at 90–92 (statement of Dr. Ken Caldeira); Hecht et al., 
supra note 71, at 2, 6; Hornaday et al., supra note 71, at 2, 7–8; IPCC Report, supra note 2, 
at 1, 9. 
